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This thesis focuses on the modernization of zhe
Chinese armed forces in the much publicized "Four
Modernizations" currently underway in China. The compo-
sition, capabilities and vulnerabilities of the People's
Liberation Army - the collective name for the armed forces
of the People's Republic of China - are identified, and
the political, technological and economic phenomena which
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I. CHINA; RESTORATION IN A NEW ERA
A. HISTORY IN RETROSPECT
China has seen a series of modernization attempts
during the last turbulent century. Whether it v/as the
"Hundred Day Reform" of 1898, the "Great Leap Forward"
of 1958, or the latest reform effort of the "Pour Moderni-
zations", advocates of different policies have had their
say, risen, and fallen. In the late 1950s, the PRC
Minister of Defense, Marshall Peng Dehuai, was principal
advocate of modernizing China's armed forces. His advo-
cacy of military modernization and his criticism of Mao
Zedong's "Great leap Policy" led to his dismissal in 1959.
The effect of his being purged was that attempts to
modernize the armed forces were dealt a blow from v/hich it
took the advocates a long time to recover. It was not
until 1975, a new direction of modernization emerged with
a speech oy Zhou Enlai at the Fourth People's Congress.
Zhou revealed his two-stage modernization scheme. The
first stage was designed to build an independent and rela-
tively comprehensive industrially oriented economic system
before 1980, and the second stage was to accomplish the
modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense,

and science and technology so that China would be marching
1in the front ranks of the world by the year 2000.
B. NATIONAL OBJECTIVE - THE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS
The death of Zhou and Mao in 1976 brought a brief
power struggle which produced the downfall of the "Gang
of Pour," a radical left-wing group led by Mao * s wife,
Jiang Qing, and the ascendancy of the moderates Hua Guofeng
and Deng Xiaping. Like the leaders in most large nations,
Beijing leaders are determined to achieve self-reliance,
national power, economic prosperity, and international
recognition.
On 26 February 1973, Premier Hua C-uofeng presented
the "Ten Year Plan for the Development of the National
Economy 1967-1985," endorsed by the First Session of the
Fifth National People's Congress of March 5, 1973. This
was basically the same two-stage plan sponsored by Zhou
in 1975. The Beijing government's objective was to turn
China into a powerful socialist nation by the end of the
century through the four modernizations.
The much publicized national objective was outlined
in Vice Chairman Ye Jianying's speech at the meeting cele-
brating the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's
Republic of China in 1979:
1. The realization of the four modernizations means
gradually turning China's agriculture into a

developed agricultural system with a rational
distribution and all-around development of
farming, forestry, animal husbandry, side-line
occupations and fisheries meeting the needs of
the people and of an expanding industry. It
means enabling the rural areas gradually to grow
into rich bases combining agriculture, industry
and commerce.
2. It means gradually turning our industry into an
advanced industrial system which is complete in
range and rational in structure and which meets
the needs of consumers and the expansion of the
whole economy. It means that China will gradually
take its place in the front ranxs of the world in
terms of gross national product and output of
major products.
3. It means enabling China's science and technology
to approach or catch up with advanced world levels.
It means that our people will enjoy stable and
gradual improvement in their material and cultural
well-being as production increases.
4. It means that China will raise her national defense
capabilities concomitantly with her economic
security and resist and defeat foreign aggressors
in case of a modern war.
3
The new leadership in Beijing capitalized on Zhou's
program - which gave legitimacy and authority to its pro-
grams for broad based modernization - and headed China
into a new era of restoration and modernization.
The plan envisions a steel output of 60 million tons
oj 1985, almost double the 31 million tons produced in 1978;
production of 500 million tons of crude oil by 1985, a
figure almost five times the actual output of 1978; pro-
duction of coal with a targeted rate of more than one
billion tons per year, which doubles the coal production
of 1973. This ambitious plan brought a new direction

and dimension to the Beijing government after years of
economic unrest during the Cultural Revolution.
C. MILITARY MODERNIZATION
All these events easily lead one to presume that under
the new leadership of Hua and Deng, military modernization
will soon follow, now that Beijing leaders are cognizant
of the needs that China has to be marching in the front
ranks of the world by the year 2000. In addition, shifts
in the power structure in the outside world - marked
especially ~oy the deepening rift between China and the
USSR and the growing detente between China on the one hand
and the U. S. and Japan on the other - not only accentuated
China's sense of military helplessness hut opened new possi-
bilities of sources and methods whereby China might be
able to take measures which would gradually tend to reduce
the gap between the strength of China and that of its
potential adversaries.
Brom 1950 to 1970, Beijing regarded the U. S. as its
principal adversary. However, with the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 1963, the Sino-Soviet border clashes
the following years, and the debacle of the United States
in Vietnam, Chinese threat perceptions underwent a drastic
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II. PRESENT STATUS 0? THE PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION ARMY; A C0MPARIS01
With the new administration in office and changes in
the threat perception, Beijing leaders began sending
military missions abroad to ""browse" at the Western
weapons and technologies at an unprecedented scale.
However, it order to understand what they are "browsing"
for, and for what purpose, one must first determine the
present status of the ?LA. This study will attempt to
analyze the present level of equipment and technology
of the PLA in comparison with that of its main rival, the
Soviet armed forces. Ihe results of this study will then
be used as a base to determine what the PLA has to do to
achieve its modernization objectives. This study will
entail all three services and the strategic force, in orde:
to determine the total efforts needed in the force moderni-
zation program.
A. ARMY
Mao Zedong once said: "Political power grows out of
the barrel of a gun . . . Yet, having guns, we can create
school, create culture, create mass movements. . ." He
further pointed out that, "the army is the chief component
13

of state power; whoever wants to seize and retain state
power must nave a strong army ..." However, in spite
of its important role in Chinese politics, the army has
not developed into a powerful modem force. The army is
basically infantry-heavy, lacks the means for tactical
and strategic mobility that characterize modem armies.
2The army, with "between 3.5 million and 3.6 million soldiers
under arms - the largest army in the world. It is organized
and deployed to 11 military regions and divided into main
and local forces.
The main forces are those regular army troops under
the strategic command of the Ministry of National Defense
cut administered 'oy the military region in which they are
stationed. Main force units intended to be availiable
whenever necessary for operations anywhere in China are
better equipped. They consist of oetween 115 and 121
infantry divisions, 11 armored divisions, 4-0 artillery
divisions, (including anti-aircraft divisions) 3 aircome
divisions and 150 independent regiments, as compared to
the 1.3 million-man army of the Soviet Union, with 118
motor rifle divisions, 48 armored divisions and 8 air-
borne divisions.
The local forces, also known as regional forces, are
those regular troops of the army stationed in and assigned
the task of defending a particular geographic area of
1A

China in cooperation with para-military units. The
local forces are normally under the command of the head-
quarters of the military region in which they are stationed.
They consist of between 70 and 35 infantry divisions and
130 independent regiments.
Over the years, Chinese planners have made a virtue
of necessity "by stressing large numbers to compensate for
the obsolescence and deficiencies of weapons. The weapons
systems currently employed by the army are mainly products
or improvements of the outmoded technology of the late
1950s and early 1960s.
1. Infantry
Due to the vastness of the country and the doctrine
of the People's ",,'ar, the ground forces of the FLA are
basically infantry oriented. Unlike the 118 divisions of
the Soviet's motorized rifle troops, the Chinese infantry
lacks the highly effective and mobile force that is essential
in the modem battle field.
The Chinese infantry soldier is thought to be
highly motivated, physically fit, well disciplined, and
7
well trained in basic skills and small unit action.
However, the numerically superior forces of the infantry
is hindered by the technologically inferior weapons in
the existing inventory, especially the outdated anti-armored
15

capability. There have been, reports of the Chinese
acquisition of Soviet Sagger wire-guided anti-tank
missiles from Egypt, and captured Saggers from the
q
Vietnamese during the recent border conflict." If this
is the case, these Saggers may be used as a model to be
copied in a program to booster China's anti-tank
capability.
In a recent article appearing in Liberation Army
ITews, numerous PLA soldiers demonstrated the skill in-
firing the guided anti-tank missile in a live fire
exercise. "he missiles fired were identified as the
Soviet Saggers or reproductions of it.
At present, there is no indication these anti-tank
guided weapons are in the Chinese anti-tank forces' inven-
tory. The current army's anti-tank capabilities are limited
to the 40mm anti-tank grenade launchers - modified copy of
the Soviet RPG-7 with a maximum effective range of 500
meters available at company level; 57/75mm recoilless
rifles with a maximum effective range of 640 meters could
be found at battalion level; 7 5/32mm recoilless rifles with
a maximum effective range of 640 meters are located at
regimental level; and 57/85mm anti-tank guns with a maximum
1
1
effective range of 1,150 meters at higher level.
Due to limited ranges, these existing Chinese anti-
tank forces can easily be covered by enemy light and heavy
16

machinegun fires, needless to say, easily outgunned by
any known tanks today.
On the other hand, the Soviet armies have been
reequipped with such new weapons as T-72 tanks, BMP infan-
try fighting vehicles of which some are mounted with Sagger
anti-tank wire-guided missiles with a maximum effective
range of 3,000 meters, and M-1974 type 122mm self-propelled
1 2gun, with stress of firepower, assaulting capability and
high mobility of the troops.
As to the overall effectiveness of the Chinese
anti-tank forces compared to that of the Soviets, the
Chinese are years behind in technology; it lacks the long
range capability; nonavailability of medium and long-range
anti-tank weapons at lower echelon level; and lacks the
portability and maneuverability in employment.
2. Armored ?orces
The Chinese armored forces are no match for the
"strike forces" of the Soviets, both quantitative and
qualitative. With 50,000 tanks in the 47 tank divisions,
the Soviets have the single most modern and largest tank
force in the world today, although a significant proportion
of these are older models and are considered to be in
13
reserve.
The Chinese main forces armaments consist of some
10,000 tanks, including the Chinese-made Type 59 medium,
I 7

Type 62 light, Type 63 amphibious tanks, and 3,500 Chinese
1 A.designed armored personnel carriers (APC) similar to the
American M113 APC. Take the case of the Chinese main
cattle tank itself. The T-59 could not cope on a one-to-one
basis with Soviet T-62s or T-72s. It is believed that the
T-59 still lacks the power traverse system, infra-red equip-
ment, rangefinder, and gun stabilizer needed for the quick
kill essential in modern armored warfare; lacks adequate
armor and mobility that is essential to its survivability,
and the lack of firepower to insure its maximum punishment
1 5
capability. The Chinese Type-63 Amphibious Tank is an
upgunned and enlarged version of the Soviet PT-76 amphibious
light tank. It has the armor thickness equivalent to the
1 6
American Mil 3 APC. This means xhe tank is vulnerable
to heavy machinegun fire. According to some observers,
China now has plans to upgrade this force, by phasing out
1
7
approximately 8,000 outdated tanks. This initial acqui-
sition costs of the new tanks and modernization of T-59s are
18
estimated on the order of between 5 and 7 billion dollars.
3. Artillery
The army's artillery includes between 16,000 and
18,000 field guns and howitzers (122mm, 130mm, 152mm) and
a small number of self-propelled artillery (SU-76, SU-85,
SU-100 and ISU-122)
.
1 Although some of these artillery
18

are self-propelled, however, their potential effectiveness
is impaired because of their limited mobility and the lack
20
of modern range-finding and sighting devices.
Unlike their Soviet counterpart, the Chinese govern-
ment has not announced or made known their tactical nuclear
capability. Thus, if one exists, Beijing has not propa-
gandized the fact in order to achieve the full deterrent
effect. Fighter aircraft, however, could be used for
21tactical delivery. Thus, the PLA can achieve a limited
deterrent effect on the tactical battlefield.
The army's air defense artillery includes some
10,000 anti-aircraft guns of various calibers (14.5mm, 37mm,
2257mm, 35mm, 100mm). These weapon systems, however, con-
sist primarily of older Soviet technology which probably
would have a limited effectiveness against a modem air
force with supersonic aircraft. In addition, these anti-
aircraft systems are located at division and anti-aircraft
23
artillery division level. Other anti-aircraft weapon
systems include about 100 CSA-1 (SA-2) surface-to-air
missiles under the control of the Air Perce. These
too are outdated Soviet technology of the late 1950s and
early 1960s. -he SA-2 defense system could be dealt with
z'j on-board electronic countermeasures against the radar.
Again, the Chinese are far behind the Soviets in
the areas of field artillery and air defense artillery both

in quality and quantity. With 20,000 artillery and 9,000
air defense artillery pieces, 1,300 rocket launchers with
tactical-nuclear capability, 10,000 fixed surface-to-air
missile sites, and an unspecified number of mobile surface-
to-air missiles ranging from SA-4 G-anef to the most sophisti-
25
cated SA-11 missiles, the Soviets represent an awesome
adversary to the Chinese military.
The great dispart y that exists between Soviet and
Chinese forces magnifies to an even higher degree when one
considers the Chinese do not have any short-range battlefield
anti-aircraft missiles such as the Soviet's SA-7 (low altitude,
shoulder fired, heat seeking) missile, or the medium range,
Roland Class anti-aircraft missile. (See Table II-l)
3. AIR FORCE
Since the initial organization of the PLA Air Porce in
1949, it has emerged from a basically "leftover" and
"skeletoned" Air Force - captured aircraft from Japanese
remnants in Manchuria and the retreating Nationalist troops
after the liberation - to one with over 4,700 combat aircraft
in the current tactical Air Force inventory. Though the
aircraft industry is steadily being modernized, it is years
behind that of the Soviet Union and United States. It was
reported that most of the jet fighters are still armed only
20

TASLE II - I
CHINESE ARMY SOVIET ARMY
I. STRENGTH: 3,600,000
MAIN FORCES: 115 Inf
Divs, 11 Armor Divs, 40
Arty Divs, 16 Railing
Divs, 150 Independent
Regts.


























57mm, 75mm, 82mm Recoil-
less Rifles, 57mm, 76mm,
85mm, 100mm Anti-tank
guns, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm,
100mm Anti-aircraft
guns, 85 SA-2 Surface-
to-Air Missiles
EQUIPMENT
A. TANKS: 50,000 IS-2/3,
T-10, T-54, T-55, T-64,
T-72 Medium, PT-76 Lig3r
ARMORED RIGHTING TEH.












7,200 32mm, 120mm, 160mm,
240mm mortars; 2,700
122mm, 140mm, 240mm Mul-
tiple Rocket Launchers;
10,800 76mm, 85mm, 100mm











TABLE II - I
(continued)
CHINESE ARMY SOVIET ARM
C. ARTILLERY (cont): (mobile
systems) , unspecified
amount of SA-4, SA-6, SA-7,
SA-8, SA-9, SA-11; About
1,300 Surface-to-Surface
(nuclear capable) to
include FROG, SS-21, SS-12




with cannon, F-6 fighters, a Chinese improvement of
the 15 year old Soviet M-19 and the Korean War vintage
MIG—15s and MIC—17s. The Chinese made MIC— 21 v/as basically
a failure. There are only about SO MIG—21s produced in
China. It was believed that the Chinese did not have the
technology and metallurgy to produce the high-yield and
sophisticated engine. Tne Chinese built MIG—21s were
nearly all out of operation in 1974-75. That failure v/as
probably the major reason why the Chinese contracted with
Rolls Royce for the purchase and the licensing rights to
27
the Spey jet engine. '
In the bomber fleet, the Chinese bombers remain
outmoded when compared to those of the U. S. and the USSR.
The most numerous is the IL-28, a Soviet light jet bomber
designed in 1947, and an over 20 year old Soviet designed
TTJ-16 Radger which did not come into production in China
until 1963. 23
In the Tactical Air Force, the Chinese do tiot, have
any aircraft that are comparable to the renowned MIG 23/27
"Rlogger" with improved radar system and speeds up to
Mach 3.2 with a maximum combat radius of 805 miles. The
F-6 (MIG—19) can only achieve the speed of Mach 1.3 and
2Q
a maximum combat radius of 426 miles with external tanks.""
This disparity is worsened by the fact that over
3,000 combat aircraft in the strategic Air Defense Rorce
23

and S50 combat aircraft in the Navy are not included in
the 4,350 com cat aircraft in the Soviet tactical Air
30?orce inventory. Again, China is outclassed and out-
numbered by its neighbor, the Soviet Union (See Table II-2)
c. navy
The PuV Navy was formally established in 1950 when
31the various regional naval forces were unified. Its
beginning was much like that of the PLA Air 7orce, formed
from basically abandoned or captured equipment from the
fleeing Nationalist Chinese troops.
Presently, the Navy has become the largest indigenous
navy in Asia. In numbers of ships, it ranks second only
to the Soviet Navy. The largest surface combat ships,
however, are limited to only handfuls of destroyers and
frigates. Its submarine force consists of some 91 medium-
range torpedo attack submarines, a I'an class nuclear
powered submarine, and a Golf class submarine with SLBM
tubes, but without missiles. 1:r.e strength of the PLA Navy
lies in its large inventory of fast attack patrol craft.
There are 160 Osa/Hola and lomar fast attack craft armed
with Styx surface-to-surface missiles. These missiles
carry a high explosive warhead with enough power to
cripple large surface combatants to include aircraft
carriers. -hey are vulnerable to electronic countermeasures,
24














3,700 MIC—23/27 -iX ,400
80 MIC— 25 170







Source: Military Balance, 1979-1980
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however, as was proved in the 1973 Middle last '.Var.
In addition to the missile "boats, the PLA Navy has 403
Fast Attack Gunboats, 220 Fast Attack Torpedo Boats, and
over 120 Hydrofoil Torpedo Boats of their own design.''
All of these attack craft are trained in high speed mass
36formations, often at night and in foul weather."' The
concept is to combine surprise, numbers and possibly in
a mixed mode to counter an advanced Soviet Navy with
electronic count ermeasures. (See Table II-3)
When it compares to the Soviet's modem "blue water"
Navy, the Chinese Navy appears to be "shallow water"
oriented. The present combat capabilities of the Chinese
Naval forces probably have only limited influence agains*
Soviet Naval operations, and it is highly vulnerable to
concerted Soviet air or submarine attack. ^r-.e highly
sophisticated Soviet anti-submarine operations probably
can easily destroy most PLA submarines in an outbreak of
war.
The PLA Navy's greatest problem is too few major
surface combatants to protect its sea lanes, versus the
Soviet's Navy capability to deny the use of these lanes.
Needless to say, the absence of aircraft carriers and the
lack of heavily armed cruiser-type surface combatants in
the PLA Navy hinder the projection of naval power and as
a credible deterrent to orotect its coastal water.
26

tab: II - 3
CHINESE NAVY SOVIET iNA ;rv








troyers which 7 are
equipped with Styx
surface-to-surface
missile , 14 fri-








(SDBM tubes but with-
out missile) : 1
D. HAN Submarine: 1
III. NAVAL AIR BORON:
800 shore-based combat
aircraft. Includes:
150, IL 28 w/torpedos,
575 MIS-17s, HIG-19s,
some 7-9 Nantan, others.
I. STRENGTH: 433,000
includes 59,000 Naval
Air Force, 12,000 Naval




A. Major Surface Combat
Ships: 275 includes
2 kiev carriers, 2
ASW helicopter crui-
sers, 16 ASW cruisers,














Badger ASM, 40 TU-22
Binder, 30 YAK-36 Norge:
(VTOL), 30 Bitters, 40
TU-16 Badger Recce, 30
TU-16 ECM, others.
Source: The Military Balance: 1979-1930
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In October 1964, the People's Republic of Cihina
exploded its first atomic comb at Lop Nor, and two .years
and eight months later, its first hydrogen comb. Between
371964 and 1979, China has exploded 25 nuclear devices.
Deterrence has heen and remains the fundamental
objective of the Chinese strategic forces. Chinese nuclear
weapons are vastly inferior to those in the Soviet inven-
tory. Its deployments are not designed to play a parx
in the conduct of a land battle, and are probably vulnerable
to a preemptive strike zy the Soviets.
1. Tuclear Missiles
Che principle of nuclear deterrence, according
to James Schlesinger, then Secretary of Defense, must be
based on a high-confidence capability for second-strike
38
retaliation. It is most certain that China nas not
come to possess a second-strike capability, but the Soviet
Union will never be able to be sure that seme would not
survive to strike back to destroy the Soviet cities in
retaliation. By definition, deterrence means the preven-
tion from action 'zy fear of the consequences; it is a




According to General George Brown, then Chairman
of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in his military
posture report for FY 1979, that the Chinese do have a
limited but credible capability for nuclear strikes by-
missiles around its periphery. Presently, three types
of liquid-fuel ballistic missiles are currently in service
4.1
with the PLA, and one is under development.
' (See Table II-4)
CSS-1: The CSS-1 MREM can reach targets in the Eastern USSR,
peripheral nations and some U. 3. bases in the Far
East. The MRBMs in service have a range of 600 to
700 miles, ^he deployed force, has not increased
significantly since 1972. It is believed to be
steadily phased out and replaced with the IRBMs.
CSS-2: CS3-2 IRBM missiles are currently deployed in
China and the number is expected to remain the
same. As currently deployed, CSS-2 missiles car-
reach targets in Central and Eastern Asia. These
missiles have a range of 1,500 to 1,750 miles.
CS3-3: The CSS-3, a limited-range ICBM system, was flight
tested in 1976. While the PRO has not abandoned
the CSS-3 program, only limited numbers will pro-
bably be deployed. This strategic missile gives
the PRO a limited capability to cover targets in
Asia, parts of the European USSR, the Marianas,
Alaska, Australia, and portions of the Middle East,
^o

but not the continental U. S. . These limited-
range ICBM systems are "believed to be able to
reach a range of 3,000 to 4,000 miles,
CSS-X-4: The CSS-X-4 is the PRCs only ICBM with a potential
to hit continental U. S. targets. It is in the
same class as the US TITM II and the Soviet SS-9.
On 21 May 1980, China announced the successful
results v/ith its first full flight test with the
CSS-X-4. Two missiles were believed to have been
launched from Xinjiang Province, and impacted in
an open ocean area in the South Pacific. It is
believed that China could have a small number of
CSS-X-4s deployed in silos cy the early 1930s, and
their effective range is estimated to be between
7,000 and 3,000 miles.
2. Strategic Aviation
The PLA Strategic Bomber Force, credited with a
nuclear capability, like their peers in the Tactical Bomber
Force, is outdated technologically when compared to those
of the Soviets and IT. S.. There are about 90 TU-16 medium
bombers with a radius of action up to 2,000 miles, available
for delivery of nuclear munition as compared to 850 in the
Soviet strategic force. In addition, the Chinese do not
have any supersonic long range bombers comparable to the
modem Soviet Backfire Bomber. (See Table II-4)
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TABLE II - 4
CHINESE STRATEGIC SOVIET STRATEGIC
FORCES
ICEX: 2 CSS-3 OFFENSIVE:
IRBM: 50-70 CSS-2 a. Navy: 1,028 SLEH in 90
submarines
MRBM: 40-50 CSS-1
b. Strategic Rocket ivorce:
AIRCRAFT: About 90 TU-16 ICEM: 1,398
Medium Bombers IRBM and MRBM: 710
c. Long-range Air Eorce:
Aircraft: 850
DEFENSIVE:
a. Aircraft: About 2,600
b. Airborne Warning and Con-
trol Aircraft: 18
c. ABM: 64 ABM-1 C-alosh
d. SAM: Some 10,000 launchers
at over 1,000 fixed sites
Source: The Military Balance: 1979-1980
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It is obvious that the Chinese nuclear forces are
no natch to that of the Soviets. The Soviet's nuclear
umbrella can only be matched by that of the U. 3.
.
However, China can be expected to continue to improve its
military capability in order to counter the perceived
Soviet threats and to achieve a capability to project
its power into other border states.
E. DEPLOYMENT
Even more fearful is the deployment of Soviet forces
along the Sino-Soviet border. Since the Sino-Soviet border
clashes in 1969, the number of Soviet divisions on the
Chinese frontier tripled to approximately 46 divisions,
including six armored divisions, with sizeable artillery,
tactical air support, and a force of short-range nuclear
missiles.
The Soviet armored forces enjoy a 3:1 superiority in
tanks and 10:1 in armored personnel carriers. In short-range
nuclear missiles, the number available to the Soviet forces
has increased. Unspecified numbers of SS-1 and SS-12
mobile missiles with ranges of 180 and 500 nautical
miles have been deployed. Nearly 200 MRBMs and IRBMs had
been deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway, including
some of the new SS-20 IRBMs with MIRY capability. In addition,





In response to increased tension following the 1969
border clashes, the Chinese initiated a major shift in
force deployment. The composition and disposition of
Chinese forces demonstrated Chinese fear and apprehension
regarding Soviet intention in the area. The Chinese
maintained the bulk of their armored forces in North
4.5
China. In the four military regions of Shenyang,
Beijing, lauzhou and Xinjiang, which are contiguous with
the Soviet Union and Mongolia, Chinese employed between
65 to 70 main force divisions, and 33 to 41 local or
regional force divisions. This means over 50 percent of
the total army strength is deployed along the Sino-Soviet
i , 46corder.
P. A;;AEE:TES3 0? ITS 1T2EDS
It is true to an extent that a superior numerical
force can compensate for the inferior weapons, but this
limit was reached and demonstrated during both the Korean
';,rar and the recent Sino-Vietnamese border conflict. The
antiauated weapons in the Chinese arsenal had been recog-
nized and remained to be a major concern in the Chinese
political and military circles.
In March 1977, Hua C-uofeng outlined his plan for the
future PLA: smaller, more streamlined and with more advanced
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weapons, tougher discipline and a more centralized line
47
of command. In October 1979, Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian
indicated the Chinese military shortcomings in the article,
"Strive to Achieve Modernization in National Defense — in
Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Pounding of
the People's Republic of China." He stated:
The fast development and extensive application
of modem science and technology have caused
tremendous changes in weaponry. The modernization
of weaponry has become an integral part of national
defense modernization.
. . . We should admit that
our army cannot meet with the demands of a modern
war. There are many questions concerning the use
of modem weapons, the organization of joint opera-




The candid attitude and the openness of the Chinese
leaders in acknowledging the anachronistic military organi-
zation lead one to believe an about-face policy of the
customary rhetoric. This change was further demonstrated
oy the Chinese military missions abroad shopping for
T,/estem arms and Hua's four- nation tour of Western Europe
in November 1979. These events marked the eagerness and
willingness on the part of the Chinese to learn from foreign
experiences and attempt to acquire the much needed modem
arms and technology.
After having analyzed the capabilities of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army, the author has come to a conclusion
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that virtually everything needs to be replaced. The
Chinese armed forces are trained, equipped and deployed
mainly for defensive missions. The ground forces lack
adequate mobility and defenses against tanks and aircraft.
As indicated in the study, most of the major end items are
outdated technology of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
The threat has been identified as being highly mobile,
armored, capable to mass attacks and firepov/er; it possesses
a long-range penetration capability; it can attain air
superiority quickly and easily; and, has an effective
tactical and strategic nuclear umbrella. In order to
counter this threat effectively, Beijing must act quickly
and dedicate completely to the force modernization program
There are some questions, however, Beijing must answer
first in order to determine the direction and effort that
is needed to modernize its armed forces:
1. Can China afford a rapid conventional force moderni-
zation program economically?
2. Will China be able to acquire large quantities of
modern arms and technologies through arms transfer
programs?
3. Will the PLA be able to absorb these modern arms
and technologies in the short run?
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III. ?IRS? OBSTACLE I IT THE MODERNIZATION OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE: ECONOMY UNCERTAINTY
A. THE COST 0? MODERNIZATION
In a recent Rand study prepared for the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Leslie G-elb indicated
several reasons for the lack of significant import of mili-
tary related equipment and technology oy the Chinese during
the past two decades. These reasons are: the Chinese
character of self-reliance, the "never again" attitude pro-
duced by the withdrawl of Sovit assistance in I960, the
shortage of foreign exchange and the resource allocation
problems generated with competition from the civilian indus-
trial sector, and a lack of willing suppliers] While these
are valid and significant points, one must not overlook,
however, the sheer size of the army was the main reason for
the lack of significant import of military related equipment
and technology. Economically, it is just not practical to
import arms to equip a four million-man army.
Unlike most OPEC nations, where resources are available
and it is relatively feasible to import modem arms and tech-




Rue to the enormous size of the PLA, force moderniza-
tion will not be an easy task. In view of more than 250
combat divisions and 230 independent regiments in the main
and local forces, modernization to the minimum level of
adequacy would call for at least 2 to 3 times the full
complement of the active U. S. Army.
In a recent Pentagon study, it indicated modernization
of the PLA would call for:
3,000 to 3,600 improved medium tanks
3,000 to 10,000 armored personnel carriers
16,000 to 24,000 heavy duty trucks
6,000 air-to-air missiles
720 mobile surface-to-air missiles
200 air superiority aircraft
2240 fighters and or fignter bombers
In the same study, it was estimated that it would cost
China about $41 billion if it bought U. S. arms and equip-
ment to upgrade its forces to a minimum level of adequacy.
This equals to roughly about three and a half times the
total Chinese defense budget for 1979 of -312.9 billion. 5
The question remains, will the Chinese economy be able
to bear the cost of this modernization?
B. PERIOD 0? ECONOMIC "READJUSTMENT"
Economically, in order for China to sustain this
immense cost of modernization, it has to have a very
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strong, stable and resourceful economy, possibly with
large quantities or the availability of foreign exchange,
a favorable trade position or high potential export markets
for its indigenous produced goods, be a reliable credit
risk, and plan its industrial capacity so as to satisfy
its civilian and military needs accordingly.
Since the announcements of the Pour Modernizations and
the Ten-Year Plan for the development of the National
Economy, 1976-1935, China's pragmatic leaders have come
to the conclusion that the goal was too ambitious. A more
realistic plan and cautious approach to development was
announced ^zy Premier Sua G-uofeng at the Second Session of
the Fifth National People's Congress on 13 June 1379. In
his report, he stated that, "the country should devote the
three years beginning from 1979 to readjusting, restructuring,
consolidating and improving the national economy," - this new
policy is believed to be the brainchild of Chen Yun, an
economic planner, now a "vice-Chairman. He further pointed
cut that, "(we must) strive to modernize our national
A
defense en the casis of a modern economy,
"
luring this economic readjustment period, the State
Investment Funds were restructured to favor the agriculture
and light industry. The heavy industry's share was reduced
from 54.7 percent in 1978 to 46.3 percent in 1973; light
industry's share rose to 5.3 percent from 5.4 percent; and,
A "l

agriculture received 14 percent compared with 10.7
percent in 1978.
According to Xu Dixin, leader of a recent Chinese
economic delegation to Hong Kong, the ambitious production
goals of the Ten-Year Plan had been reduced. The grain
production target of 440 million tons by 1985 has oeen
pushed bach to the end of the 1980s; the goal of doubling
iron and steel production to 60 million tons by 1985 has
been pushed back to the end of the decade; and with growth
of .05 percent and 1.9 percent in coal and oil production
respectively in 1979, it is not expected that China will
be able to attain its goals set in the Ten-Tear Plan.
Moreover, China has planned to allocate 20 percent
to 25 percent of its annual export earnings for the repay-
ment of foreign debts, according to Chinese Foreign Trade
. . _ . . 7
Minister Li Qiang.
The purpose of this three-year economic readjustment
program was to allocate greater emphasis on agriculture
and light industry to balance the uncertainty in the economy
caused oy a 06.5 billion budgetary deficit reported in 1973,
and the costly war with Vietnam in February and March 1979.
^
Due to the rapid turn-over nature in the agriculture and
light industry sectors, the Chinese government can realize
quick return on investment, especially when these two sec-
tors account for a substantial portion of China's exports, and
also be able to meet the ever increasing domestic demands.
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In the interim, however, these events will definitely
have an adverse effect on the modernization of the
national defense.
C. LACK OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE - TRADE DEFICIT
In the arena of foreign exchange, it was reported just
recently that China has "banned the circulation of foreign
currencies as of April 1, 1980. Instead, foreign exchange
certificates are being issued to foreigners and overseas
gChinese. Due to the attractiveness of the foreign
currencies, Chinese can buy imported goods sold only for
hard currency in special shops meant for foreigners.
Chinese planning to emigrate also need hard currencies,
and Chinese factories and institutions are trying to by-pass
the normal channels and buy imported equipment directly
with foreign exchange. These events have led to high-
demands in black market trading, and it is threatening the
10
stability of the country's currency, the Yuan.
To secure the much sought after foreign exchange, the
Chinese embarked on various programs to improve its foreign
exchange standing. These included the newly created joint-
venture program, increased emphasis on export of raw




Through the establishment of the joint-venture code,
Beijing hopes with large foreign technological and capital
investment in the Chinese light industry, it will generate
a large portion of the country's foreign-exchange earnings.
As indicated earlier, light industry generally means quicker
returns on investment, at the same time provides more consumer
goods so the population can achieve possibly higher standards
of livings, and because it is usually labor intensive, it
means it can help to eliminate seme unemployment problems
that are staggering the Chinese economy. Ma Hong, Vice
President of the Academy of Social Science, Beijing's think




Since the adoption of the much publicized joint-venture
law almost a year ago, the Chinese have been and still are
in the process of drafting regulations to implement the
joint-venture lav/. Due to the delay in finalizing the
legal framework and the lack of corporate, labor, tax law
and other ordinances, many foreign investors are hesitant
1 2
to take advantage of this opportunity.
In the field of foreign trade, China exports rose to
between 013.2 billion and $13.5 billion, while imports
rose to between §15.3 billion and 315.5 billion from $11.35
billion, 15 with a deficit of almost 02 billion. Though, one
must consider almost 20 percent of the imports are in plant, tech-
1 A.
nology and capital investment. ' This could mean in the long run
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China can generate more goods and services for future
exports, thereby, creating a higher foreign trade standing.
In light of the Sino- U. S. normalization in January 1979,
tourism has become an important industry in China. It was
estimated that over a million tourists had visited China in
1979, and state funds 3.re being spent on the development of
1 ^40 major tourist areas to attract more foreign visitors.
The Chinese have not published the estimated sales of goods
and services through tourism, but it can be estimated to be
in the vicinity of the billion-dollar mark.
Although with these and other economic programs, China
was only able to achieve a light economic growth and a trade
deficit of almost %2 billion. It is clear that in the short
term, China will not be able to improve its foreign exchange
standing, and this means military modernization could be
affected by it. The future of the Chinese foreign trade,
however, is glistening at the end of the long dark tunnel
~oy the recent passage of the Most Favored Nation status
in the United States and the admission of China into the
International Monetary Funds.
D. NSW DEVELOPMENTS
On 24 January 1930, the U. S. Congress overwhelmingly
approved a resolution giving China the Most Favored Nation
status. It means lower tariff and the right to conduct
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trade with the United States on an equal basis with most
other foreign nations. According to the national Council
for U. S. - China Trade, Most Favored ITation status for
China could mean anywhere from a minimum of -3400 million
to a maximum of .$1 billion in extra imports of Chinese goods
over the year I960 to 19S2. 1 ' Whether this will remedy
the Chinese economy is something that has yet to be seen.
On 17 April 1930, China was voted into the International
Monetary Fund with a quota of about $700 million. This
means considerable financial aid for China and a much better
position for its future loan negotiations.
I. SUMMARY
Under the new management, the twentieth century Chinese
economy has just entered into the adolescent phase. With
the recent passage of the Most Favored liation status by the
U. S. Congress and the admission into the International Mone-
tary Fund, China's economy is now growing at a rate much-
faster than what it is accustomed to, and the new economic
policy of "readjustment" is a reflection of some of these
growing pains. China's economy has great potential, limited
only oj its ability to plan and allocate critical resources
to the civilian and military sectors. On one hand, any
large acquisition of military hardware will be accompanied
with tremendous costs and will interfere seriously with
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other modernizations - agriculture, industry, science and
technology. On the other hand, Chinese cannot effectively
deal with the northern threat from the Soviets with an
antiquated force.
In the interim, emphasis on agricultural and industrial
sectors mean less for military modernization, especially
when it is magnified with the competition for foreign
exchange and the shortage of it. Thus, economically, it
is net possible for China to undergo extensive moderniza-
tion of the armed forces until at least 1932, at the con-




1. Richard H. Solomon, ed. , Asian Security in the 1930 :
Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition
,
( Santa
Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1379), p. 264.
2. Hew York Times , 4 January 1980.
3. The China Business Review , July-August 1979, p. 45.
4. Beijing Review , Ho. 40, 5 October 1979, p. 24; Par
Pastern Economic Review
,
8 June 1979, p. 11.
5. Par Pastern Pconomic Review, Asia 1980 Yearbook
,
(Hong
Kong: Par Pastern Pconomic Review Ltd. , 1380)
,
p. 159.
6. he Asian V/all Street Journal , 1 March 1980.
7. The Asian Wall Street Journal , 4 February 1980.
8. John P. Starr, "China's Economic Outreach," Current
History
,
September 1979, p. 51.
9. Beijing Review , No. 15, 14 April 1980, p. 6.
10. The Asian T.v'all Street Journal , 4 February 1980.
11. Par Eastern Economic Review , 17 August 1979, p. 53.
12. he Asian Wall Street Journal , 21 January 1930.
13. he Asian V/all Street Journal , 28 January 1980.
14. Asia 1980 Yearbook
,
p. 162.
15. Ibid, p. 163.
16. San Jose Mercury , 25 January 1930.
17. The China Business Review , August-September 1979, p. 23.
13. The Asian Wall Street Journal, 21 April 1980.
48

IV. ABSORPTION PR02L2HS - THE HUMAN
ELEMENT - SECOND HURDLE
A. EEEEOT ON THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
China recently disclosed that illiteracy has increased
during the past ten years. It is estimated that about
120 million people under the age of 45 are now illiterate,
according to Deputy Minister of Education, Zang Doping.
Indeed, the 3-reat Proletariat Cultural Revolution has taken
its toll. During this chaotic decade (1967-1975), millions
of young students donned with. Red Guard arm hands, marching
through the streets of China, chanting and shouting the
slogans of Mao's "little red book," destro2^ing anything
that bears the resemblance or considered bourgeois influence.
During this period, many party officials and educators were
attacked, arrested, humiliated and were forced to confess
their "crimes" at public trials. Rivalries between different
factions had almost caused an economic stand still, and
most school and universities were closed for the better
part of these turbulent years. Consequently, China has
produced a generation of semi-literate youth for whom there
is no place in the social and economic arrangement.
It is difficult to assess and measure the extent of
damage caused oy the Cultural Revolution, especially the
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intangibles - repercussions that this will have on the future
generations. In the mean time, shortages of skilled workers,
technicians, soldiers on one hand and millions of unemployed
semi-literate youth on the other have caused an economical
and technological absorption problem in China. Many Western
observers have come to regard to youth of this era as the
"lest generation.
"
t . iixh oU liDlAKb
The soldier, whom is a reflection of society and is
the basic element in the military-technology absorption
process, is thought to be unsophisticated and not tech-
nologically gifted, said Dr. Harlan Jencks. He further
indicated that the Cultural Revolution has affected the
soldiers educationally, militarily and ideologically well
into the mid 1970s. Its residual effects are being felt
in the armed services today as evidenced by the low techni-
2
cal proficiency demonstrated oj the individual.
The making of a Chinese soldier starts with a unique
situation in China's military conscription system. It is
plagued with the problem of screening the millions of
youth that are eager to ^oin every year, since the armed
services are among the most alluring paths to success in
Chinese society. By the conscription physical standard,
the recruits are the "cream of the crop. " V/ith the
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peasant-worker class background, they are used to regi-
mentation and relatively simple life style and have a strong
sense of obedience and under competent leadership will
attempt to carry out his mission. While the overwhelming
majority of the recruits are middle school graduates drawn
from the peasant-worker class, some, however, who can neither
read nor write Chinese are recruited, especially minority
5people. These problems definitely had an adverse effect
on the capabilities of the PLA. It is believed that the
technical deficiency can alone constraint the modernization
of China's armed forces in the near future, especially with
the employment of sophisticated v/eapons and equipment. Per-
haps it was best summarized in a recent Pentagon study:
"Take the form of technology or high-techno logy end
items, China's ability to absorb and utilize the
technology would be questionable. Zven the mainte-
nance of low-technology equipment would be problematical




The concern of this technical deficiency was expressed
by Xu Xiangqian, the Mnister of Defense of the People's
Republic of China:
"...our armvmen's scientific and cultural level is not
high and that an army cannot be modernized if its men
do not have modern scientific and cultural knowledge,
there are acute contradictions before us and we must
make arduous efforts to resolve them. Otherwise, even
if our army has advanced weapons, it cannot use them
and bring them into full play. "7
Besides the technological constraint, the PLA soldiers
have been hindered oy the fact that historically they v/ere

the working, production and political forces in China.
It was not unusual during farming seasons, soldiers in
army uniforms are often seen working together with the workers
and the peasants. Synonymous with the PLA are its renowned
association with civil affairs and political entanglements
throughout its history. Therefore, time is divided between
the PLA's various missions that otherwise could be devoted
to training.
Recently, the emphasis on politics and motivation in
military training has been discarded in favor of strict
attention to technical and tactical studies based on the
"lesson" learned in the recent 16-day Sino-Yietnamese
3
oorder war. The Chinese have realized the importance
and the lack of combined-arms operations in the recent
conflict with Vietnam - which has cost them dearly.
To redress this ill, the Chinese are beginning to train
Q
infantrymen and artillerymen together.^ Mao's once respected
military thoughts are now seen almost useless. This was
v/eli illustrated in the 22 October 1979 issue of People T s
Tally . It said:
"The military thought of Mao Zedung is a science that
develops with growth of practice and not an unchange-
able dogma . . . the principles, politics and tactics
should also be changed accordingly. "10
V'ith the removal of these constraints, the way to pro-
fessionalism is wide open. Military discipline has beer-
tightened and the military training has oeen stepped up
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1 1to enable troops to master complex weapons systems.
Under the present Military Service Act of 1978, the com-
pulsory military service in the army has been lengthened
from two to three years, and the technical personnel are
1 2
often retained for longer periods. It appeared that
the Chinese had made an effort to prolong the length of
military service to compensate for the longer tactical and
technical trainings required for the peasant-worker based
army. However, the work loads for this new generation of
soldiers will not vzxy significantly from their predecessors
due to its continued association with the "work force and
production force" concept as indicated by a joint circular
issued by the Headquarters of the General Staff in October
1979. T'he message called on the whole army to carry on
this historical tradition, so they can give assistance
in capital construction, farming or in major projects in
13
the cities in order to advance tne four modernizations.
C. THE OFFICER CORPS
"... ITo modernization, however, could have succeeded
without large numbers of officers skilled in running a com-
1 A
plex military establishment," said Professor Ellis Joffe
of the post-liberation Chinese arm:--. This massive project
of military modernization faced by the Red army leaders in

the 1950s v/ill again be the major challenge to the Chinese
Officer Corps of the 1930s.
like the soldiers, the Chinese Officer Corps was seeded
with basically the same problems because the majority of
officers are chosen directly from the ranks. The system
of 1955 - 1965, under which officers were commissioned
straight out of colleges and academies, has been abolished,
although this continues in the cases of certain types of
technical specialists whom are selected from graduates of
senior middle schools for advanced training at military
1 5technical institutes.
Selection criteria are based as much on ideological
orientation as on proven military ability, ' this is par-
ticularly true during the era of "reds versus experts."
This selection process, however, is seen leaning more
toward the military ability as a result of the Sino-Vietnamese
border war. Those who distinguished themselves in the war
are being quickly "commissioned" into the Officers Corps.
Turing the latter part of 1979, Fuzhou Military Region
Infantry School enrolled 1,600 new officer students, of
1 7
whom 1,100 were veterans of tne Vietnam campaign.
There are other indications of a resurgence in military
professionalism. First, it was reported in Beijing Daily
in August 1979, that 20 military academies were recruiting




and military command personnel. ~ This can be clearly
seen as a beginning of a return to the "academy system"
and the distinction of an "officer class." Second, the Chinese
high command has ordered a reshuffling of leadership organs
and a weeding out of undesirable personnel in the Officer
Corps, and the stated criterion for the appointment of
19
officers to important posts is professional competence.
lastly, according to the party journal, Red Ylag , a set of
regulations concerning the recruitment of officers had been
promulgated but without giving any significant details about
20their contents. Like the ancient Chinese philosophical
teaching of "Yin-Yang" - the greater "Yin" grows, the sooner
it will yield to "Yang" - the relationship of "red and
expert" has been on the shift since the death of Mao and
the ascendancy of the pragmatists Hua and Deng. This
"Yin-Yang" cycle now puts the "experts" slowly back into
the dominate position. ?or example, in an article published
by the Liberation Army Yews , in reference to officer training,
it stated that, "the key to successfully training troops
lies with, the officers, and that the officers cannot be
trained with the same methods as those for soldiers, for




In addition, since the Vietnam Campaign, the Chinese
22have given enormous emohasis to technical training. In

an October issue of Red Flag , it demanded that officers
should be trained in modem science and technology. In
addition, training should be hard and related to likely
2"*
combat situations. ^ In March 1980, a Chinese PLA leader
was interviewed by a group of Japanese reporters at the
Defense Ministry in Beijing. The PLA leader commented:
"Beginning this year, the Liberation Army will undergo
changes in the direction of alioting most of its time
to strengthening military training. As a result of
this, the army's productive activities will be limited
to vegetable production and hog raising
. . .
V/hen the
economic development progresses, these productive
activities will also be terminated. Work is underway
now to examine the possibility of reviving the rank
system for military personnel . . . This decision is
based on our experience from the war with Vietnam.
The "Beijing Society for International Strategy" has
already been inaugurated for the purpose of studying
the strategic situation of the world . . . " 24
The Chinese military has definitely embarked on a plan
to revive and alter the human element of the national
defense - the least costly of all. If these policies were
indeed carried out, the Chinese armed forces will be on a
much firmer foundation to sustain the infusion and inte-
gration of sophisticated arms and technology in the future,
But, one should realize that a well trained soldier will
not be totally effective unless he is complemented with
proper equipment to accomplish his mission.

D. THE WORKERS A1TD TECHNICIANS
In the 1S78 Watershed Plan that changed the course of
China, Kua G-uofeng spoke of the need of science and tech-
nology. He said:
"We must raise the scientific and cultural level of
the entire Chinese nation to a much higher level so
that our working people will master modern techniques
of production and scientific knowledge. At the same
time, we must build a vast army of working class
intellectuals. Only thus can we successfully fulfill
the grand target of building a modern, powerful socialist
country . . . The gap between our own and the advanced
world scientific and technical level which has been
narrowing has widened again in recent years. The
quality of school education has fallen sharply. In
all fields of endeavor, there are not enough trained
younger men and women ready to take over from older
experts . . . We must conscientiously study the advanced
science and technology of all countries and turn them
to our account." 25
The Chinese have instituted various methods to upgrade
the scientific and technological level of their work forces.o
It ranges from the revival of the work-study ' and spare-time
27
education for worker programs; the establishment of tele-
vision colleges to train workers and staff members without
28
absence from their posts; to the urging of enrollment of
young people into vocational and technical school to meet
29
the needs of the four modernizations. But to raise the
scientific level among the workers alone would be a herculean
task when one considers the size of the Chinese work force
of 100 million people. It was reported recently by Chinese
sources that between 70 and 80 percent of China's workers
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today have not attained the level of junior middle school
graduate, the equivalent of our junior high school level.
In addition, only two-thirds of them have achieved the rating
of a second or third grade worker status with eighth grade
being the highest, and merely three percent of the workers
30
are employed as technicians. Perhaps even more critical
is the lack of managerial expertise suitable for large-scale
31
modern industrial complex. This critical shortage of
competent technical and managerial personnel will signifi-
cantly limit the military industrial capability to absorb
foreign technology because it is this human element that
determines the ability for the industry to incorporate,
adapt and reproduce technology.
Without much success, admitted Hu Yaobang, General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party. He further alleged that, "... T.7e have failed to
bring about an upsurge in the movement to love and study
science on a nationwide scale." He then proposed three
measures to develop scientific undertakings:
•The first important one is to form with great
resolve a contingent of truly socialist-minded,
competent cadres with expertise
•The second important measure is to build up
the ranks of science and technology in a big
way, into an effective force and a reserve for
our country
•The third important measure is for the whole Party
to give full support to scientists and scientific




The dissatisfaction expressed by Ku was all too well
illustrated in his speech. In the first measure, he charged
that many cadres are not technically proficient and ar3
still being selected and promoted according to the "old set
pattern" - politics rather than expertise. He further
stated that many comrades in the party still do not trust
people who have knowledge and expertise. In the second
measure, he criticized the damages rendered ~z~j Lin 2iao
the the "Gang of Pour" during the Cultural Revolution in
which approximately 160 million young people between the
ages of eight and eighteen neglected their studies. In
order to build up the ranks of science and technology, he
called upon the second "re-study campaign" since Mac's
earlier effort in the "socialist education movement" during
the early 1960s. Under the last measure, he cited the
shortage and substandard level of scientific and technical
personnel. Hence, he called en the party to take the lead
and support this effort.
Prom one of degradation during the Cultural Revolution
to one of institutionalization in the period of restoration
and modernization, the new Chinese leadership has completely
reversed the policy of higher learning. -hey are cognizant
of the fact that seeds blown along the way sides and on
rocky soil by the cultural wind will have to be replanted




painful and tedious for most, out it is a necessity if
one is expected to survive and flourish in this new era.
The nutrient prescribed is correct but the seeds are just
too many. Due to the lack of facilities of the approxi-
mately 100 million workers in China, only 500,000 are able
to participate in the various education programs.
There is no "quick fix" in this growing process as the
Chinese will learn.
In a paper presented to the 31st Annual Meeting of the
Association for Asian Studies, Chun-Yuan Cheng, a professor
of economics and Chairman of Asian Studies at Ball State
University, indicated the disability of the Chinese to
rapidly absorb modern technology due to the retarded growth
of science and technology in China. He cited an article
which appeared in the People's Daily in October 1977. It
reported that 68 percent of the sample of college graduates
given examinations failed mathematics, 70 percent failed
in physics and 16 percent failed chemistry. The article
further stated that the tests were designed to cover "basic
34knowledge that high school students snould know." Indeed,
the Cultural Revolution not only has impeded the growth of
the past generations, but has also created an obstacle for
the Pour Modernizations.
To insure the proper soil for the growth of future
seeds, China has reformed its education system through the
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revival of competitive examinations for university admission,
the resumption of graduate education, the selection of 33
key universities for special attention, abandoned the require-
ment for labor between middle school and college, reintro-
duction of the Chinese Academy of Science, and the resumption
of high-quality research.
This national effort is augmented with regional endeavors
such as the "Jiangsu Plan." Under this proposed plan,
measiires are being taken in Jiangsu province for the
selection of competent personnel through the following
means:
•Personnel will be examined in different disci-
plines and the best qualifed scientific and
technical workers will be promoted to higher
position.
•Contests in single subjects (such as mathematics)
will be held each year for junior and middle
school students. The best qualifed students may
enter the colleges without going through compe-
titive college entrance examinations.
•Students who fail to achieve the required marks
in the competitive college entrance examinations
but are recognized for special skills may enter
a university to receive training in the related
specialty.
•University students who have talent in a special
course may apply for a transfer within the uni-
versity to study in the related fields.
•Recognized experts should have assistants of their
own choice.
•Active measures will be taken to help middle aged
and young scientists and technicians to continue
their studies abroad. 36

V.
rith the national and provincial aspiration, China has
set a goal of training 800,000 new scientific research and
technical workers by 1985, and plans have "been announced
for Sino-American and worldwide student exchange programs,
eventually involving 15,000-20,000 students of primarily
scientific and technical disciplines. 9 As of January 1930,
China has sent over 2,230 scholars and students to 33 coun-
tries, to include the son of Vice Chairman ~2<eng Xiaoping,
studying as a graduate student in Physics at the University
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of Pocnester in tne United States.
j'.ie urgency to catch-up in the fields of Science and
•Technology was well illustrated in a conversation between
Vice President Dr. Zhou Peiyuan of the Chinese Academy of
Science, and Pep. Lester Wolff, who was on a fact finding
mission in China. Dr. Zhou said:
"In our plan for the development of science and tech-
nology, we are also going to undertake more than 100
programs. The 27 spheres include the basic science
and also applied science. Among the over 100 programs,
eight programs are vital. They have a vital bearing
on the development of our national economy. The eight
programs are: 1) the research of agriculture; 2) material
science; 3) energy; 4) computer science and technology;
5) laser; 6) space science and technology; 7) high-
energy of physics; and 8) genetic engine eringi'39
These technology acquisition priorities were substantiated
by the initial group of Chinese students sent to the United
States during the year 1973-1979. (See Table 17-1). In
addition to this outflow of knowledge seekers, Chinese Minis-
try of Education has invited over 370 professors and specialists
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TABLE IV - 1
imitial ohiuese students to u, s.;
eislds 0? interest 1973-1979
Physics 58
Radioelectronics 50





















TABLE IV - 1
(continued)
Source: Committee on Scholarly Communication with the
?RC, Rotes on Student Exchanges with China
,
(1 Rovemosr 1973), pp. 3-6.
Adapted from Richard Baum, ed. China's Four
Modernizations: The ITev; Technological Revolution
,
(Colorado: vTestview Press, 1930)7 p. 170
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from 13 countries to lecture and instruct in the various
fields of science.
Thus far, the overall accompli shment by the education
reforms is only a small step on the long, steep and diffi-
cult road ahead. To accomplish the objectives set out by
Hu Yaobang, China will have to elevate science and technology
to a position of equal importance to that of agriculture and
ahead of that of industry. To reeducate the 100 million
existing workers and to discipline properly over 214 million
students enrolled between middle and graduate schools - more
than the total population of the United States and Canada -
China will be faced with a task that is unequal in the
history of mankind.
It was reported recently because of the shortage of
colleges and universities, only 270,000 students were
4-2
enrolled from a field of 4.6 million candidates in 1979.
Lack of properly trained educators, facilities and resources
will not enable China to revamp its whole education system
for at least 5-10 more years.
3. SuIHIARY
In 1979, only $1.65 billion were allocated in the
national budget for cultural, education, public health
4-3
and science. 7or a country of nearly one billion
people, it means only about 07.65 are spent on each

individual for education, health and welfare, and science
and research. It is believed that much of this budget goes
to scientific research and not to school. Unless the
Chinese remedy this situation quickly, scientific and tech-
nological improvement will only be escalated on an incre-
mental basis. It is doubtful whether China can absorb large
doses of high technology under the present condition. This
deficiency will continue to haunt China's modernization
effort well into the 1990s. There is no short term solution
to this aggregated problem, only temporary response. However,
in the long run, once the level of proficiency is gained,
China will have unlimited potential. As Hua said:
"If we popularize science and culture, if we raise the
nation's scientific and cultural level and integrate
popularization with higher standards, and if we forge
links between specialists and laymen, we can certainly
form a huge army of scientific and cultural workers
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v. phd idiiidady iitdusddiai coaudlux:
daudd technology
A. TECHNOLOGICAL SODHISDICADIOX - MIXED INDICATIONS
In a recent editorial appearing in ; eople's Daily
,
the modernization of science and technology was defined as
1the "Key" and the "Central Link" of the Dour Modernizations.
It is certainly true that technology is extremely important
to the modernization effort. Like the needs of a strong
economy and stable political environment, technology is
an integral part of a host of variables that are inter-
dependent of each other, and they are all essential to the
total modernization effort.
China has made substantial progress in the last five
years toward its goal of modernizing its armed forces. Even
though the technology possessed oy China are known to be
10 to 15 years behind the United States and the Soviet
Union, its technology still represents a very significant
capability and it must not be ignored.
It is very difficult to assess exactly what level of
sophistication and technology is possessed ~c~j the Chinese
due to the different emphasis and priority placed on
different military industrial developments. Dor example:
China has the capability to launch a strategic nuclear IOSM
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missile, yet it does not have the ability to produce a
high-performance jet engine. Although it is a holder of
nuclear submarine technology, still the Chinese are pro-
ducing outdated 1950s vintage tanks to field its army.
It is the essence of this chapter to determine the
level of technology that has oeen achieved oy the Chinese
in its earlier developments, and it will explore the tech-
nological gaps and time required to achieve the moderniza-
tion of military industry.
B. ZAP.LY MODERNIZATION EFFORTS - IN RETROSPECT
With the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance
and Mutual Assistance, in Moscow on 14 February 1950, and
the reluctant entry of the Chinese "volunteers" in the
2Korean T, .rar, the Soviet's were quickly forced to come to
the aid of the unprepared and ill equipped Chinese forces.
Unlike the well equipped North Korean Army, the PLA -
under the name of the "Chinese People's Volunteers" were
the same tough but poorly equipped infantrymen who had
defeated the Japanese and the nationalists. According to
Ellis Joffe, the Chinese were still armed with rifles and
small quantities of automatic weapons of various calibers,
which the~ r had cantured in the earlier wars, "hey had
little artillery and virtually no armor or air support.
Standardization of equipment or organization was virtually

nonexistent. Due to the variety of sources, the Chinese
found themselves in possession of an international arsenal;
this further complicated the already weak suppl;/ system
k-. creating additional difficulties in supply of ammunition. 3
Under the Soviet Military Assistance Program, the Chinese
army began its initial modernization effort to reequip all
its forces by taking advantage of the "protracted" truce
negotiations.
It was reported the 1951 military expenditures reached
43 percent of the Chinese "budget. The once nonexistent
PLA Air Porce had reached an estimated strength of 2,480. '
By late 1952, the PLA infantry divisions no longer resembled
the light division that had crossed the Yalu in October 1950.
Ultimately, China became the recipient of one of the biggest
arms sales in modem history. Between 1950 and 1957, China
accrued approximately $2 billion of debts. It was reported
in China in 1955 that money was collected from school
5
children to defray the ever growing military expenditures.^
The deoendencv on the Soviet arms diminished toward the
late 1950s when the Chinese began to receive Soviet
assistance in creating the Chinese military industrial
complex. This included the partial construction and assembly
of jet fighter aircraft, complete construction of light piston
aircraft, and construction of tanks, small patrol boats
and submarines. China received what most have come to
73

refer to as "the most comprehensive technology transfer
in modern history. " Basically, it is this same military
industrial complex of the 1950s that the Chinese are
operating on today.
Presently, there are over 400 defense industry plants
in China producing everything from small arms to plans
and missiles. These plants are spread among the eleven
military regions with heavy emphasis in Northeast China.
There are 73 defense industry plants in the Beijing mili-
tary region, 69 in Sheyang (Manchuria), 52 in Nanjing, 50
in Chengdu, 45 in Lanzhou, 34 in C-uangzhou (Canton), 33
in Wuhan, 29 in Kunming, 14 in Tuzhow, eight in Jinan and
7
one in Xinjiang.
The development of the Chinese military industrial
complex has been that of a "roller coaster" effect. This
erratic behavior has teen the results of the struggles
between the "self-reliance" and "moderate" schools. Since
the break with the Soviet Union in 1959 and the withdrawl
of the Soviet technical assistance in I960, the Chinese have
"been hesitant to rely on any one supplier. The philosophy
of "self reliance" has dominated the theme of modernization
throughout the past ten years - surpassed by the "moderate"
school only after the failure of the former school.
In the mid-1960s, just a few years after the unsuccessful
attempt of the C-reat leap Forward, there was a big increase
m-

in purchases of technology and a number of complete plants
were ordered; this time from the "'test. Almost immediately
after the resumption of technology transfers, the Cultural
Revolution broke out. During this period of unrest, acqui-
sition of modern tehnology decreased markably. Between 1966
and 1972, purchases of complete plants were ceased entirely.
After the Cultural Revolution, Chinese imports of machinery
and plants were again on the rise. In 1973, the dollar
amount of whole plant contracts reached $1.2 billion mark.
V/ith the steady increasing control by the "Gang of Four,"
the emphasis on technology was reversed back to indigenous
production. This was climaxed with the death of Zhou and
Deng Xiaoping, an advocate of the "Pour Modernizations,
'J
was purged in April 1976. Shortly afterwards in September,
Mao died, and the G-ang was arrested. Again, imports of
technology and plants were on the rise. By 1973, it had
reached an all time high of -36.9 billion."' The trends of
these imports can be seen in Table V-l. It must be noted
that most imported machinery and whole plants are devoted
to the development of an infrastructure, the network of
support fmiction, such as coal and electric power, transport,
communication and electronic, iron and steel. These supporting
elements are prerequisites for the development of military
industries.
A closer examination of the imported technologies
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chemicals, engineering and metallurgy which require great
needs for precision and quality control - especially in
defense productions. It has been reported by foreign spe-
cialists with access to China that average technology in
electronics, machine tools, iron and steel, and aircraft
industries is seven to twenty years behind Western standards.
In General Brown's military posture report, it noted the
principal growth in China's military production has been
in the aerospace industry. It is believed that China is
working toward technological independence in this high
technology area, as seen through their current drive in
the development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
System.
One must not be deceived solely by the success in the
development of nuclear and strategic delivery systems,
and to conclude that China has arrived or will soon arrive
at the stage of technological independence. On the con-
trary, as indicated earlier, there are some extreme im-
balances within the Chinese military development and
production technologies. With the current plan, it is
clear that China will not be able to achieve parity with
the U. S. or Soviet Union in military capability oy the
end of the century - it is unlikely that China can achieve
even second-power status unless it can take drastic and
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The Chinese leadership is aware of this major defi-
ciency and has been trying to overcome this "roller coaster"
effect "oy int eg rating the "self reliance" and "moderate"
schools - with emphasis on "self reliance." This integra-
tion effort was well illustrated in an editorial appearing
in an October 1973 issue of the eijing Review ;
China's production techniques in industry still
remain at the level of the 40s and 50s. labor
productivity in our iron and steel industry is
well below that of the best abroad. In the newer
industries, the disparity is much greater.
Y/e acknowledge our backwardness so as to swiftly
change our backwardness. And how are we to bring
this about? Mainly by relying on our own efforts
and at the same time extensively importing advanced
technology that is good from abroad
. . .
Importing
techniques and equipment does not mean abandoning
"maintaining independence and keeping the initia-
tive in our own hands and relying on our own
effort." On the contrary, it is strengthening
our ability to stand on our own feet. 11
This attitude was again reflected recently in the much
regarded P:eport on the Current Situation and Tasks ^oy Leng
Xiaoping:
3hina is such a big socialist country, but it is
impossible for China to take this kind of "shortcut,
(complete foreign dependence) V/e must also make
use of foreign capital and technology and ener-
getically develop foreign trade. However, v/e must
emphasize self-reliance. 12
The present regime is acutely aware of this costly
technology and reliance dilemma, and it has been trying to
formulate a pragmatic approach to the importion utilization
-

of foreign technology which does not antagonize excessively
with the traditional school. Self-reliance is now being
promoted as the main theme, complemented with foreign
melodies. This was substantiated by Secretary Brown in
his recent trip to China. After meeting with top Chinese
officials, he commented, "China can neither afford the
financial cost of fully equipping their military with arms
purchased from other countries, nor can they afford to be
dependent on others." He further elaborated, "what they have
1 3in mind is to buy enough to leam how to make their own."
In the past China has been laiown to gain foreign tech-
nologies through the method of "reverse engineering. " This
self-reliance process of acquiring foreign equipment, strip-
ping it down and copying it, has lengthened the process of
reproduction and created substandard performance equipment.
Che first reported mayor undertaking was the development
of the Soviet MIG—21. without the benefit of license and
Soviet technological assistance, China began its develop-
ment of an "acquired" Soviet MIG--21 in the 1960s. '
It was reported that approximately eight years were
spent in setting up the production plant in Chengdu,
Sichuan, however, due to the difficulties encountered in
metallurgy, aircraft oroduced were badly underpowered and
Cached the thrust of a high yield and sophisticated single
engine MIG--21. "his ill-conceived effort produced only 50
to 30 MIG—21s, and the production was ail but ceased by 1975.
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Another possible major "reverse engineering" oroject
was revealed "by a recent foreign visitor to China. He
indicated that the Chinese are building a cow or deriva-
tive of a Boeing 707 jetliner - product of a 1354 technology
in a plant on the outskirts of Shanghai, He further stated
that the aircraft had been fitted with four Pratt and
Whitney engines identical to those used in ten Boeing 707s
China bought after the Nixon visit to Beijing in 1972. In
addition, he cited that the plane had just completed the
1
6
structural test and has yet to be taxied or flown.
Although the Chinese have denied that the jet transport
plane being built is a copy of the Boeing 707, and it is
1 7
of a Chinese design, one cannot dismiss the fact that
40 extra engines were purchased by the Chinese at the tine
of the Boeing sale. According to aircraft executives, this
amount of replacement engines were far more than would
1 8
ordinarily be needed. w Since the Chinese nave no; openly
denied the uses of the Pratt and v/hitney engines, they did
little to discredit the report. If this report is accurate,
it means the Chinese still have not attained the metallurgy
to produce the light weight, heat resistant metals required
for modern jet engines.
'vithout the benefit of foreign technological assistance,
the Chinese have taken almost a deca.de to copy and yet to
reproduce a possible prototype aircraft of a 1950s vintage.
30

This lengthy "research and development" process by reverse
engineering could be the last major attempt in acquiring
foreign technology without foreign support.
Production of high technology and sophisticated equip-
ment is by no means a small task - even with foreign
technological assistance. Retooling from basically a
1950s and 1960s to one of 1980s defense industries will
be a herculean feat. The tremendous development and pro-
duction costs that have to be borne by the economy; micro-
miniaturization of electronic and computer sophistication
required for most modern military hardware; metallurgy
needed to produce light weight, heat resistant metals
necessary in aerospace industry; thoroughly trained and
highly qualified technicians and scientists; the much
needed time; a well balanced and developed infrastructure;
and many other variables needed are beyond that of most
third world nations. Although China's relative position
is between that of a third and second v/orld nation, many
facets of their technologies are still that of a third v/orld
nation.
Michael Moodie noted that the development of infra-
structure in a third v/orld defense industry will generally
be in seven lengthy stages:
1. Maintenance and overhaul facilities are established
for the service and reoair of imported arms.
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2. Licenses are negotiated for the domestic assembly
of a particular system, and unassembled kits are
put together.
3. Simple components are domestically fabricated under
license while sophisticated components, such as
engines and electronics, continued to be imported.
At this stage, the third world producer can begin to
earn some foreign exchange by selling components
or finished systems back to the licensor or else-
where
.
4. The developing country decreases the number of
components for a given system that must be imported
and a point is then reached which the third world
state can be said to be producing the entire system
under license.
5. Components for weapons systems are designed locally
and incorporated into existing systems.
6. Production of domestically designed systems is
begun, initially using some imported components
embodying more sophisticated technologies beyond
the capability of the third world, producers.
7. Indigenously designed systems incorporating no
imported components are manufactured. 19
This step-by-step process by which using the infrastructure
and experience acquired at one stage as a building block to
move onto the next will take years - depending on the level
of existing technologies and infrastructure. In addition,
this process ~"j which to increase domestic defense production
through foreign assistance car. often be easily led into an
interminable dependency on foreign technology. 3y the time
it has reached the final stage, self reliance, the equipment
will likely be made obsolescent by further advancement in
the second and. superpowers. In order not to fall behind,
3 2

state-of-the-art weapons or equipment have to be pro-
cured, which requires a new series of dependencies u"oon
the suppliers.
Take the case of the Spey engine. Between 1975 and
1976, China had purchased 50 Rolls Royce Spey 202 jet
engines from Britain and the rights to manufacture them
under license from hits, with British technicians as advi-
20
sors zo assist and oversee the proejct. This was the
first major coproduction package involving high technology
transfers between China and a developed nation. With
this assistance, China began its development and produc-
tion effort at the second stage of Moody's chain.
The Spey 202 engine, a product of the 1960s, was the
power plant used in the British version of the McDonnell-
Douglas F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber. It has the capability
and was designed for a Mach 2 aircraft. Although it is not
clear what purpose the Chinese had designed for the Spey
engine, it has been alluded that the Chinese are building
a modified or a derivative of Soviet MIC— 25 jet fighter
acquired ~z~j the Chinese through the Bgyptians, and the Spey
engine would be used as the power plant for this aircraft. '
It has been five years since the inception of this
coproduction program, and the Chinese have yet to produce
the first series of this engine. According to the latest
report, the Chinese have only produced two prototypes and

22they are s~i_.i in the testing stage. The F-4 fighter,
which the Spey engine was used by the British as its main
power plant, has already been outmoded by the new genera-
tion of sophisticated aircraft, the F-15 and 7-15. If
the Chinese can absorb this new gained technology from
the Spey engine and promptly put it into application, they
v/ill still be years behind the superpowers. It is not
surprising to note that Vice Premier Peng Xiaoping has
expressed to the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
visiting China in mid-April 1373, that China was interested
in both the McDonnell-Douglas 7-15 and the F-16 jet fighter
25
of General Dynamics - signs of interminable dependencies
on foreign technology.
Production of advanced weapons systems and equipment
will remain to be a major obstacle for China in the coming
decades. Technologies in the critical areas of defense
industries such as metallurgy, engineering, electronics and
chemical are far behind those of the developed nations and
superpowers. To develop, build, and train a modem military
industrial complex will be very time consuming and difficult;
but, without it, China will not be able to support a modem
armed force. Vfith the new attitude expressed ~oy the present
regime, the much needed foreign technologies 8,re being
8&

transferred at an unprecedented scale. Theoretically,
China should be able to gain ground and narrow the tech-
nology gap with the developed nations and superpowers through
massive technology transfers. Many developmental stages
and "reinvention of the wheel" can be avoided. However,
quantum jumps can only be made when the technologies are
assimilated oj the society and developments in all critical
areas are balanced. This "protracted" process is unlikely
to narrow the gao significantly by the end of this century.
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. APAI LAPP PIPY 0? Ail! IS SUPPLIERS
a. modernization cp the military - arms plaitspers
"The whole world estimates that the 1930s will be a
dangerous decs.de," said Peng Xiaoping, in his recent report
on the current situation and tasks at a cadre conference.
C-eneral Pavid Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, predicted, in his military posture statement last
year, that the 1930s will he a period "of widespread inter-
national turmoil and instability. " At a recent meeting
of defense and foreign ministers of the Atlantic Alliance
at Perth Atlantic Treaty Orangization (PAPO) headquarters,
the Defense Planning Committee of PAPO reported, "We are
entering a period of high risks." President Carter, as a
candidate in 1975, repeatedly called for a cut of -35 to
Zl billion in the defense budget, concluded that the
early 1930s were especially dangerous, and he proposed
a 4.5 percent annual real dollar increase in military
expenditure for the next five years. These proclamations
were the results of intimidation by the nemesis of world
peace - growing Soviet military prowess and its unconstrained
ability to project its might.
Amidst this international security awareness, the
European security alliance has gained a new "anonymous

partner" in arms - the People's Republic of China. In
reality, China has been an "anonymous partner" for over
a decade - ever since the Sino-Soviet confrontation at
Chenpao Island in 1969. At present, China is tying down
approximately 45 Soviet divisions with sizeable comple-
ment of artillery, armored forces, tactical air support
and a force of short range nuclear missiles. This repre-
sents about one-quarter of the total Soviet forces.
It can be seen easily that any lessening of tension
in the Sino-Soviet relation could well mean more available
Soviet froces to be redeployed to the European and/or
Middle East theaters, thereby increasing the possibility
of a Soviet attach in these volatile areas. Evidently,
with its "anti-hegemony" foreign policy directed against
the Soviet Union, China is an important silent partner
in the maintenance of world stability in the 1950s. There-
fore, it is in the interest of the Western alliance to assist
in the modernization of the Chinese armed forces to offset
the favorable balance maintained ~c" the Soviet Union, and
to employ this relationship with China as a means of
influencing Soviet action. However, a school of thought
has emerged with the premise that sophisticated military
arms and technology transfers to China will antagonize the
Soviet Union and result in a serious deterioration of Soviet-
West relations and could trigger a Soviet phobic reaction -
a preemptive strike on China.
RQ

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the effect
this dilemma has on China's ability to acquire sophisticated
arms and technology, and the availability of willing ams
suppliers to support the Chinese modernization program.
3. AVAILABILITY 0? SUPPLIERS
Although it was suggested in the previous chapter that
the Chinese cannot afford either the cost of equipping
their military with arms from other countries or dependence
on other countries for weapons, the Chinese have not
lessened their interest in the purchase of critical and
the much needed high technology weapons for its immediate
national defense.
The purchase of foreign arms and technology has begun
during the mid-1970s, with the purchase of the Eritish Spey
engines and the French helicopters. throughout 1973 and
1979, Chinese military delegates were appearing in Europe
and the United States "browsing" for modern arms and technology
Their interests ranged from the French MILAH anti-tank
guided missile to the F-16 jet fighter of General Dynamics.
Their shopping trips had taken them to the United States,
C-reat Britain, Trance, Italy, '.'est Germany, Sweden and
Yugoslavia, climaxed with Chairman Hua C-uofeng's four nation
tour of "Western Europe in late 1979. However, these top
official visits had yet to produce eziy major purchase of
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modern high technology weapons. The interest and purpose
of these military delegations had intrigued and puzzled
many Western analysts.
Angus Fraser, who has written and lectured widely on
Asian political-military affairs, studied these "browsing"
sprees through some S5 reports from 23 separate press and
journal sources, together with several interviews of recent
2
visitors "uo Cnina. Ihe results of his study were astonishing
(See Table 71-1).
Over 70 percent of the items listed v/ere basically
defensive type of weapons and equipment, with the British
Vertical and short Zaire offs and landings (TSICl) Harrier
jet fighter as the single most frequently mentioned item.
It seems as the Chinese had placed the matter of defense
as a top priority in acquisition of weapons and equipment.
'.1 though this was not without Soviet influence. Due to
the Soviet "pressure", most of the prospective European
suppliers were apparently only interested to sell what
they considered as defensive weapons.
Francis Romance, Senior China Analyst at Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) discussed four probable motiva-
tions of these visiting Chinese military delegations.
First, Romance indicated that these visits could be useful
to expose the senior Chinese military leaders to modern
high technology weaponry of the ".'est and to "shock" the
qi

""I" ' H3 S EXPRESSED INTEREST SI 7~01 1 JAMUARY l^ 1
"71?
V/hole aircraft (25) and spares 34.1?:
Anti -1ank weapons 17.6 " S
Shelter, nuclear attack 9.5?4
Anti-submarine warfare gear 7.1"'
Computers with military applications 5.3":
Reconnaissance and communications satellites 5.9"-
Anti-aircraft weapons 4.7"'
Tanks and Armed Personnel Carriers 4.7":
Nuclear weapons and missiles 3.6%
Naval engines 2.3/3
Submarine s 1.2.:




* Discrepancy due to rounding
Source: Angus h. Iraser, "Military Modernization in China,"




military leaders into realization of China's military
backwardness. Second, these trips could be served as a
tool to acquire the much needed information on the techni-
cal specifications of the weapon systems they have observed.
Third, through the performance aspects of the weapons, the
Chinese could presumably gain some appreciation for modern
Western doctrine relating to their employment. Fourth,
these window shopping expeditions could he served as a
vehicle to further its anti-Soviet world-wide United Front
Policy.
^
These trips by the Chinese military delegations have
ended with various hypotheses and speculations from Western
analysts, and left behind many confused arms suppliers.
In reality, "besides the Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's
announcement that the United States was prepared to sell
bina a dual-capacity (civilian and military) Landsat
4
surveillance satellite ground station, the Chinese have
not made any significant purchase of Western weapons systems.
Although it has heen suggested that the purchase of British
harrier jet fighter and the French MILAN and HOT anti-tank
guided missiles are imminent, the actual purchases have yet
to he announced "uo date. It is evident, however, the Chinese
have gained the much needed knowledge, the awareness of
their own backwardness, and the appreciation of Western
technology and military strategy.
93

Whether the Chinese major interests lie in the defen-
sive type weaponry or their motivations had remained one
of "browsing," further analysis has indicated that the
Chinese have basically confined their window shopping
sprees to three of the four world's largest arms suppliers -
C-reat Britain, Prance and the United States.
n rpTTTP PUPCPPAPS - PPITISH AITS FRENCH
1. -:ritish
Being the first major European nation to recog-
nize the People's Republic of China upon its inception,
the British have had a lengthy relationship with China.
Being an island nation, Pritain is very dependent en its
international trade. In a study by U. S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, British, total exports accounted
for 19.1 percent of its CPP in 1976. While the United
States, the world's leading trading nation, accounted for
only 6.3 percent, and the Soviet Union accounted for only
3.7 percent of its C-KP for 1976. 5
The British arms and transfer policy is dominated
~c-j economic and industrial reasons. Meaning that the
domestic market is too limited for the military industrial
complex to he cost effective. Consequently, exports of
arms Dlay an important role in the survival of the national
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defense production line." The competition for export
market has "been so vital to the British that it has been
known that the British forces were to make do with obso-
lete equipement while the most modern items went to meet
export orders.
In December 1975, the British ignored a recommenda-
tion from the China Coordinating Committee (COCOIl) and con-
q
eluded the sale of Rolls R.oyce Spey engines with China,
and represented the first major military technology trans-
fer between Britain and China - a, communist nation.
Presently, under the tutelage of the anti-Soviet crusader,
Margaret Thatcher, the British government is probably one
of the "best hopes for the Chinese to obtain high technology
weapons and equipment to counter their common adversary.
This cooperation in the past (3~oeir engine) was probably
also a major consideration for the Chinese in choosing
•J-"-, --,-._-,, — £j- „• _-u.i.,__^ ? n- „ V> + ayv--t: I O -LVJ -_c~i_ ^ X ^ _ aO l/Cl^:.. L __l< — J-.
This versatile aircraft, capable of vertical and
short takeoffs end landings would he particularly useful
to zs.z Chinese because it requires no airfields. It is
especially suitable for use along the Sino-Soviet border,
-..'here it could be easily positione - * and concealed on the
ground. Although it probably represents a logistical
nightmare, and the aircraft has been known for its mainte-
nance and safety oroblems through the experiences of the
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U. S. Marines, this highly regarded defensive aircraft
still represents a state-of-the-art technology that is
unmatched in the- Chinese inventory.
Although the final purchase has yet to be announced)
it has been reported that the negotiations have resulted
in a "stripped" export model in which the aircraft will
not ce equipped with inertial navigation systems or offen-
sive attach systems. Also, it has no laser rangefinder
or an" hind of fire control system in its armament. v Other
reports indicated that China has scaled down its purchase
plans and it is only interested in buying one or two Harrie:
1
and Then reproducing it indigenously. Whatever the out-
come, the conclusion of the harrier sale to China would
ie British had taken another steo in worsening their
relations with the Soviets and the Chinese could improve
their unfavorable military balance against the Soviets.
A.S lawrence Zreedmar indicated, "sales to China, would repre-
sent one of the few examples of the use of arms sales as
1
1
a positive instrument of foreign policy ^cy the British. " '
Aside from the Harrier deal, the British had ini-
tiated another first in their capturing of the China
market. On 26 March 1930, with British Secretary of State
for Defense, Mr. Frances ?ym, presiding over the opening
ceremony, British companies opened a military aviation
exhibit in Shanghai. It was the first British national
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exhibit of aerospace products in China and was the largest
such British exhibition outside Europe. Equipment ranged
from full size Rolls Royce engines to large seals models
1 2
of aircraft, nelicopters and space stations. It is
evident that Britain will continue to be an aggressive
arms supplier and will probably play a major role in the
modernization of the Chinese armed forces.
2 . French
With assistance and aid from the United States
after World War II, Prance has slowly regained its position
as a major arms producer and supplier. Like many aspects
of Britain, Prance was among the first to extend recogni-
tion and establish diplomatic relations with Beijing, and
its economy also depends heavily on international trade.
In 1976, Prance's total experts accounted for 15.4 percent




like the British, French arms transfer policy is
heavily influenced by economic and industrial reasons as
principal motivations, In order to maintain an advanced
domestic armaments base to ensure their independence from
the super powers, it is necessary to export large quanti-
ties of arms in order to reduce the cost of new weapons
by diffusing research and develop, ent expenditures over a
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large number of units. It was estimated in 1976 that of
the 170,000 workers in France's armaments industry, 75,000
^1T> !3 -n Q v r> o -n + -,rrs-v-»o evu-o tqH in -{-Vi a mannfair almost ^J percent were engaged, in tne manuiacture oi
1 4
arms destined purely for foreign sale. Consequently,
exports of arms not only play an important role in main-
taining the life of the military industrial complex, but
also the "balance of payment and economic survival.
Similar to the British Spey engine venture in
the mid-1970s with the sales of French Frelon helicopters.
Since then, the Chinese have shown considerable interest
in the purchase of the French Dassault - Preguet company's
"Mirage 2000" F-l fighters, a sale the French government
1 5feared would harm its relations with the Soviet Union.
Thus far, the French have made known that they are only
prepared to supply defensive weapons. This bowing to the
Soviet pressure is a departure from the French arms trans-
fer policy, and it represented a rare example in which the
French government subordinated its economic concern to
political reasons.
Other French arms deals included the much discussed
purchase of French PCELM and HOT anti-tank missiles, as
well as anti-aircraft missiles. These were originally
discussed ^oy the Prime Minister N. Raymond Farre, on his
visit to Feijing in January 1973. However, like most
q q

commercial contracts, these arms deals have been frozen
when moratorium was imposed on all contracts due to economic
1 6
"readjustment." The faith of these contracts will not
"be known until the Chinese leadership can hammer out its
priorities.
As a nation, Prance was known for its independence
in foreign policy and actions. As an arms supplier, France
was known as a merchant whose strategic and foreign policy
objectives were subordinated to arms sales. The Mirage
jet fighter deal with China marked a shift in Trench arms
transfer and foreign policy, and the emergence of a triangular
relation of Paris, Moscow and Beijing. v/hether the shift
v/ould be diverted bach to its old track will depend on the
cost effectiveness of the Franco-Eus so economic and political
relations vis-a-vis the Sino-Franco ' s relations.
Frances's willingness to sell the MIIAC.! and HOT
.anti-tank missiles demonstrated its determination in
achieving the maximum utility value of this triangular
relation. The essence of the future Sino-Franco relations
will pro:abl~ r depend on the attractiveness of the Chinese




I. J. 5. - China delations
Modem Sino-American relations may best be compared
to that oT the pendulum swing. During World War II, at the
height of the swing, the two nations fought along side each
other against the Japanese. After the conclusion of World
War II, the United States became the unsuccessful mediator
in the Chinese Civil War in which the Nationalist was finally
iefeated and communist China was brought into being in
October 1949. luring the post-war era, one found the two
nations were differed in the Taiwan matter. Is the pendulum
continued its down swing to the left, the two nations found
themselves diametrically opposed in the Korean Peninsula,
Again, in the 1960s, they were found on the opposite sides
of the Vietnam War. The Sino-Soviet confrontation in 1969,
the end of the Cultural Revolution, and the inauguration
Df a new administration in the White House nod slowly assisted
in oscillating the pendulum back to the right. During this
continued uDswin^, military confrontation and ideological
differences gave way to peace and stability. With the
exchange of recognition and diplomatic relations in January
1979, the Sino-American relation has inched toward a new
height in the atmosphere of detente and rapprochement.
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2. I. S. Ass [Transfer Policy
Sines 1373, a major shift has taken place in the
nature of U. S. arms transfers from arms aid under the
Military Assistance Program (MAP) to arms sales under the
Foreign Military Sales Program. In a study prepared for
the house Armed Services Committee, it was estimated that
by fiscal year 1981 a ban on Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
Program would lead to a lower current dollar C-UP by approxi-
mately 320 billion, and total loss of employment would be
about 350,000 joes or 0.3 percent higher in the unemploy-
1
7
ment rate. The impact of FMS has on domestic employ-
ment, the gross national product and the whole economy
is indicative of its importance. Yet, unlike the French
and the British which fall into the "economic" category,
the United States as the leading arms supplier in the world,
belongs in the "hegemonic" (searching for security or partial
influence) category, along with the Soviet Union.
In an effort to cure the ever growing arms experts,
presidential candidate Jimmy Carter spoke out against the
size and direction of U. S. arms transfer. He said, "The
United States could not be "both the world's leading champion






As President :arter in 1977, he announced a six-point
restraint arms sales program:
•The dollar volume (in constant Fiscal Year 1976
dollar) of new commitments under the Foreign
Military Sales and Military Assistance Programs
for weapons and weapons-related items in Fiscal
Fear 1978 will be reduced from the Fiscal Year 1977
total
. . . and will be reduced in Fiscal Year 1979
from the total in Fiscal Year 1978.
•The United States will not be the first supplier
to introduce into a region newly-developed, advanced
weapons systems which could create a new or sig-
nificantly higher combat capability. Also, any
commitment for sale or coproduction of such wea-
pons is prohibited until they are operationally
deployed with U. S. forces . . .
Development or significant modernization of advanced
weapons systems solely for export will not be
permitted.
•Coproduction agreements for significant weapons,




. . the United States, as a condition of sale
for certain weapons, equipment or major compo-
nents, may stipulate that we will not entertain
any requests for retransfers . . .
•An amendment to the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations will be issued, requiring policy
level authorization by the Department of State
for actions by agents of the United States or
private manufacturers, v/hich might promote the
sale of arms abroad. In addition, embassies and
military representatives abroad will not promote
the sale of arms . . . ^°
^he President further pledged that the Administra-
tion would seel: the agreement of other large arms exporters
in holding down world wide sales. However, Britain and
France rejected the Administration's proposal, and negotiations
.02

with the Soviet Union on limited arms exports to third
21
world countries ended in failure in December 1373.
In January 1920, President Carter announced his
support to build a new American jet fighter, known at
this stage as the FX, solely for export. "President
Carter's decision to allow development of a new fighter
plane for sale to foreign countries means his policy of
restraining arms sales is dead," said Sen. William Proxmire
he further states, "From here on out, it's back to the old
22
sel-L anything to anyone at anytime policy. "
Phis new policy represents a major modification
of President Carter's stand on arms sales restraint. It
is not known at this time if the President's efforts to
constrain arms sales has given way under the pressure of
arms manufacturers or to use this new policy among others
to counter Moscow's recent actions in Afghanistan. It is
difficult to perceive if this action would affect arms
transfer to China in light of the Sino-American rapproche-
3. P. 3. Arms Transfer Policy in Relation to China
The U. S. arms transfer policy toward China has
also seen a continuous modification since the initial
thaw of the Sino-American relations in 1972. The LT . 3.
oo si ti on toward the allies was changed from one of "extreme
i03

opposition" to "silent acquiescence" and presently one of
"voiced encouragement" in conducting arms sales to China.
Although U. 3. arms sales policy toward Uhina has remained
that of "no sell," the sales of U.S. commercial technology
has taken a jump. After the Nixon trip to China in 1972,
Boeing announced its sales of ten Boeing 707s to China,
and more recently sold Beijing, three 747 wide-body and
long-range airliners.
It is recognized that the question of arms transfer
to China has a strategic implication - the triangular
relationship between Washington, Moscow and Beijing.
The perplexity of this triangulated relation has
intrigued multitudes of academicians and government offi-
cials since President IIixon f s trip to China in 1972. In
1975, Michael Bills cury, a Rand analyst, published an
article in Boreign Bolicy magazine of possible U. S. -
China military ties. He advanced the idea of a U. S. -
China strategic relationship through the transfers of passive
and defensive military technology. The advantages to the
United States could he threefold, according to Billscury.
Birst, the military relationship could he served as "reward"
for the "pragmatic Chinese policy," and further Sino-.American
diplomatic relations. Second, it could stabilize the Sino-
Scviet confrontation and forestall a future Sino-Soviet
war which could jeopardize world peace. Third, increased
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Chinese military capabilities along the Sino-Soviet "border
could mean tying down additional Soviet military forces
that could otherwise he deployed against American allies
in the European theaters. '
In 1977, Doak Barnett, an old China hand v/rote in
the Foreign Affairs magazine, that the United States should
proceed the Sino-Anerican relations with "caution. " Bamett
further conceded that the time is not yet mature for trans-
24fers of "purely military technology or hardware" to China.
In 1573, Edward Luttwak, a senior fellow at the
Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies
spoke out against the use of the "China Card" - a term that
has come to he recognized as the leverage the United States
has over the Soviet Union through improvements of the Sino-
American relations in the areas of social, political, tech-
nological, economic and military. He reasoned that helping
Shina militarily could provoke the Soviet Union into using
force against China or other Soviet military scenarios and,
-1
- <- o--»ci -^n^o i + "i Q Heal -r —n P fa P 1" i -~ cr "
Chese different views taken ~:y three distinguished
scholars and other opponents and proponents contributed
to the formulation of the three schools of thought of the
China card by Robert Sutter. They are the "Manipulative
School" - American policy toward China does affect the
Soviet Union; the "Low Impact School" - Sino-American
relations have had and are likely to have little impact
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on the Soviets; and the "Honmanipulative School" - U. 3.
policy toward China impacts heavily against the Soviet Union,
therefore, the United States should anticipate and adjust
for the impact on the Soviet Union, and should not try to
26
manipulate the China policy.
In the past, the U. S. policy has been one of
evenhandedness and equal distance toward Beijing and Moscow,
Until very recently, the united States had stated time and
again that it will not sell arms to China. Cn 4 October 1979,
a secret Defense Department study with prospects of posi-
tive U. S. military links with China was conveniently leaked
to the Tew York Times . According to the study, the vul-
nerability of Soviet Central Asia would increase significantly
if United States forces were based in China or if China
received transfers of modern arms and equipment from the
"Test or increased indigenous production. The study further
added that even in a war between China and the Soviet Union,
the United States should consider the possibility of military
2^
support for China. ' Although the Defense Department main-
tained that the reoort was only the results of a staff study
and in no way represents the policy of the Department of
Defense or the United States government, it has an added
significance when mixed with the announcement of Secretary
of Defense Harold Drown' s visit to China, - first ever by an
American Defense Chief since 1949. As Diehard Burt wrote

in the Yew Pork Tines , "The planned visit and the Pentagon
report on military options seems to reflect a gradual shift
28in American policy.
"
This "gradual shift" tool: on a traumatic change in
the U. S. arms transfer policy toward China after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On 6 January 1930, during
his eight- day trip to China, Secretary Brown announced one
of the toughest U. S. warnings yet to the Soviet Union.
He said that the United States and China may take "comple-
mentary" military action if their "shared interests" are
29threatened. A few days later, vice Premier Deng Xiaoping
demonstrated his anti-Soviet hard liner attitude with an
even stronger reply:
"The Soviet Union is the main source of a turbu-
lent international situation and a threat to
peace and security. China and the United States
should do something in a down-to-earth way to defend
world peace against Soviet hegemonism. 30
These anti-Soviet inspirations were soon turned into
action. On 3 January, the United States took another major
step toward an emerging U. S. - China alliance when Secre-
tary Prown announced the sale of a sophisticated Landsat
surveillance satellite ground station to China. It shifted
the U. S. policy from the strictly civilian sale to that
of dual capacity.
Although the main purpose of the ground station was
to enable China to assess its harvest prospects, plan its
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forest protection, search for oil and gas and manage other
natural resources; it probably will enable China to proceed
faster in developing its own surveillance satellite and
earily warning systems and improving its high speed com-
31puters. As Secretary Brown said, "The United States
intends to provide China with the advance technology that
will speed the development of the whole Chinese economy - and
32
nave significant military application as well."
The Pentagon study leal:, the sale of the Landsat
ground stations and Secretary Brown's visit to China, although
it was arranged much earlier, coincided with Soviets actions
in Afghanistan. These events unequivocally had a signifi-
cant impact on the Washington, Moscow and Beijing triangular
relations. It appeared the Carter administration had aban-
doned the policy of evenhar.de due ss in American dealings
with China and the Soviet Union.
On 19 March 1930, the U. S. arms transfer policy
toward Uhina too> a great leaD forward when the Carter
Loministratioi announced it will consider sales of military
support equipment to China. This includes equipment such
as transport aircraft, helicopters, trucks, radar, advanced
communication systems, etc."''' In a hay issue of the Uar
Zastem Aconomic Aeview , it indicated that the United States
is currently considering the possibility of selling conven-
34
tional weapons to China, including cruise missiles. '
10*

V/hether it is the perceptiveness of the author or if it
was "inside" information, the U. S. arms transfer policy
has evolved drastically since January 1920, It appeared
that it is only a matter of time before lethal defensive-
type weaponry will be replaced on the U. S. Munitions list
for sale to China.
In hay 1930, Q-er.g Piao, Deputy Prime Minister and
5ecret-ar"-r General of the Communist Party's Militarv Affairs
Commission, visited the United States on a two week tour.
Prior to his departure from Beijing, he indicated that China
had not yet made any specific request for American arr.s.
".
. .
cut we might touch on this during my visit," said
Geng. he further said, "I think if there is anything the
United States would like to sell to us, we would be glad
to buy it, if it is one of those things we are in need of."
The Chinese have denoted earlier of their needs as Deng
Xiaoping expressed to the U. S. Senate Foreign Delations
Committee visiting China in mid-April 1979, that China has
interest in both the McDonnell-Douglas D-15 and the D-16
3^
fighter of General Dynamics. Other sources nave indi-
cated that China was also interested in buying Lockheed's
C-130 Hercules transport, the P-3C Orion ASW patrol aircraft
and the A-10 ground attach aircraft.^ 7 On 29 hay 1930,
the ". S. government approved expert license applications
for a wide range of military support equipment to China.
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These items included air defense radar, helicopters,
33
comniunication equipment and computers. In June 1920,
U. S. - China relations took another step forward when
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, announced that the triangular
diplomacy of the early 1970s is no longer an "adequate
conceptual framework in which to view relations with China.
"
He further declared that the United States "will develop
3Q
our relations with China on their own merits." This
open declaration indicated a strong growing temptation in
the United States to play the "China Card."
It must he expected that the Chinese will buy these
and other critical military support equipment promptly and
willingly. In order to he a credible "partner" to the
United States, the Chinese will further denounce and attach
the Soviet hegomonism. To gain further U. S. assistance,
the Chinese will try to solicit the United States to play
the "China Card." As Mr. Gezig urged "our American friends
to rest assured that China's relations with the Soviet Union
rere not likely to improve. ,40
nearly one million troops on the Sino-Soviet borders, the





Tims far, what had transacted in the newly found Sino-
American relations is only a very snail part of what the
United States is capable of, Whether there will be any
further escalations of the U. S. arms transfer policy
toward China, it can be assured that this issue will be
intensively debated by academicians as well as various
agencies within the TJ. 3. government. Numerous direct
and indirect variables, causes and effects, pros and cons,
will all have to be considered before finally playing the
so-called "China Card." The final and main determinant
to Dlay the "China Card" will deoend on the view taken oy
the U. S. in analyzing Sino-Soviet policies,
As of mid-1980, it is evident that China will not be
a'cle to quickly obtain high technology weapons with lethal
implication through the U. S. , French and British suppliers.
Any speed up in acquisition could only be made possible by
some drastic diplomatic development which as yet does not
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The combination of antiquated Chinese military forces,
the perception of a growing military threat, and the advent
of a new pragmatic administration in China had given the
drive for the modernization of national defense as part
of the "Four Modernizations" in 1978. However, the attain-
ment of this goal - to "build China into a powerful socialist
nation by the year 2000 - has been plagued with the results
of poor standards of living, a grov/ing but still fragile
economy, and enormous but low technological proficient man-
power base in both the military and industry, and the lack
of willing arms suppliers. These events had caused the
Chinese leadership to reassess and to revamp its priorities
and goals
.
In January 1979. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping informed
Sen. John Glenn during his visit to China that "the defense
modernization has a lower priority than the other three
modernizations." He further elaborated that the remainder
of this century "will be devoted primarily to modernizing
ground forces with up-to-date but non-sophisticated equip-
ment." i This decline in priority was further corroborated
in Vice Chairman Ye Jianying's speech at the meeting cele-
brating the 30th anniversary of the founding of the People's
Republic of China. Ye spoke of the modernization of
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agriculture! industry, science and technology, and national
defense - in that order (see Ye's speech in Chapter 1 ).
Phe real decline in national defense modernization, how-
ever wi! T,°_"Jr! i"/'' ~to ho se^ "^
The civilian heavy industry and science end technology
has been an integral and vital part of the military defense
ce xo
of defease i"^ d*^ s ~"""" ola^
—
'~fi. p.yiH sn t^f^^c^'^'
III £ i,i -Vi ^ ci 'rir e s e - cad^rrw of ^ c i ^ "~ c ° 1 o r> ^ ~ f2 ^ 1 %~
two northeast military regions - Beijing and Shenyang (see
Aopendix A) . Any acceleration in the development of heavy
industry and/or seier.ee and "technology are likely to have
a direct or indirect "benefit on the modernization of the
military defense industry. In essence, military moderniza-
tion T,\'ill he the ultimate henefaotor of any gains 'z~j other
modernizations. She decline of the military defense in
the four .uodemizauL ons priorities "/ill probably mean less
r»5»T)i "hnl P'Hfl "PPROIIT*?"'PS p~r>^ ;1 " ^fio-2^ ^O'^ f] -1 "'t d ft — -p.-- vtn'^pc^.q
of foreign arms and equipment cut actually more will he
devoted for the purchases of high foreign technologies -
especially technology for producing weapons.
"*~ ^ X^-'O ,1"K1QC!Q 4-QnVwn t ^ C?~T -'--0





Moody's building block concept, whereby step-by-step process
using the infrastructure and experience acquired at one
stage as a building block to move en to the sore advanced
stage. "his process, oy which the technology know-how is
transferred to construction state then to production capa-
bility, will span over a long duration. It usually means
the more sophisticated the technology, the longer it will
take to assimilate. By the tine it has reached the stage
of self reliance, the equipment will likely be made obso-
lescent oy further invention or renovation by other powers.
This is likely what prompted the Chinese leaders to forego
the state-of-the-art technology and rely on the more "up-to-
date but non-sophisticated equipment." It can he expected
in the next few years that the Chinese will purchase limited
modern but unsophisticated critical weapons systems and the
accompanied production rights for its indigenous productions.
The shift of priorities in the "four Modernizations"
and the deviation of a set goal of military modernization
represented en abandonment of the quick-fix position to a
long-term growth solution. These events indicated that the
modernization of the military will be long and tedious, and
that the Chinese armed forces will not he able to "march
in the front ranks of the world" by the end of the century.
There is no doubt, however, of the Chinese resolve to
modernize the military along with its other priorities,
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,+nol 1- will approach the status in the world
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